Abstract: In his`Cooperation as joint action', Tuomela presents a we-mode account of cooperation, which he argues has several advantages over an individual account. This commentary examines to what extent this is true. In particular, I assess three related characteristics of we-mode joint action: its possible rationality, its greater eciency, and its alleged irreducibility to purely individual properties, which are recurring points of the article.
neglected the kinds of reasoning that can lead to cooperative behaviour, their normative properties and the empirical evidence that may support them. If joint action is dened by collective intentions based on a given mix of beliefs, goals, commitments and/or reasons to act, how can these be attained in the rst place?
To which kind of cooperative behaviour do they lead? Are they understandable from, generated by or reducible to individual mental properties? These are the questions that Tuomela now sets about answering. In the following discussion, I
will focus on three related topics of we-mode joint action: its possible rationality, its greater eciency, and its alleged irreducibility to purely individual properties, which are recurring points of the paper.
Usually, for a joint action to be rational is not considered as a necessary
property, but at best as a welcome one. Suppose I dene joint action as a set of intertwined individual beliefs, goals, intentions, etc. It may seem that the origin of these mental states should not matter, as long as the agents entertain them.
However, denitions usually mention the causes that lead to these mental states.
For instance, in Tuomela's denition of we-mode cooperation (CWM), it is not enough that the basic conditions be mutual belief among agents; the mutual belief must also be a reason for these conditions to hold in the rst place. The idea is that not only must agents entertain the adequate mental states; they must have reached them for adequate reasons as well. Simply put, real cooperation exists when we all have a common goal and decide to act partly because we are aware of this commonality. So reasons to act enter the picture, although nothing is said about how they are assessed and combined within the agents' reasoning process. It is thus legitimate to ask whether it is rational for agents to cooperate when in the we-mode.
Tuomela answers positively. First, mutual beliefs must be rationally attained (74). Moreover, agents must rationally presupposeand in general also believethat the other participants will indeed perform their parts [. . . ] . Basically, it is neither rational nor`group-socially' benecial for one of them to defect at least as long as the others do not defect. A participant cannot defect without being legitimately criticizable by the other. (74) In the we-mode, agents act for group reasons in order to realise a collective goal, to which they are collectively committed. The previous quote shows that these three conceptual pillars are actually supplemented by a fourth, hidden one, namely the requirement that agents reason collectively. A form of rationality becomes integral to the denition of cooperation, which may be problematic with weaker forms of cooperation, but not with the full-edged forms that we-mode However, the place of rationality in the we-mode raises two possible issues.
First, it seems that the importance of rationality is inversely related to that of collective commitment. For to say that defection is irrational in the we-mode entails that any participant can legitimately criticize defectors, which in turn is just a way of expressing the fact that all participants are collectively committed to the goal and cannot unilaterally decide to stop furthering it. Indeed, in classical game theory, in which rationality reigns supreme, there is no need for the concept of commitment: a strategy is either irrational, in which case no commitment to it can be credible, or rational, and commitment to it is superuous.
As a consequence, collective rationality may at least join and at best replace collective commitment as a main conceptual pillar of the we-mode.
Another worry is that if agents in the we-mode genuinely adopt the group's interests and goals, and if in principle, free-riding is an I-mode phenomenon (83), then there should be no need for sanctioning agents or giving them incentive. However, such actions are expected from group leaders and participants (75; 76). Intuitively, a possible reason for this would be that when agents mistakenly consider two actions as equally benecial with respect to the group goal and choose the worse one, others may resort to sanctions in order to steer them towards the better option. However, if an agent genuinely has the group's interests at heart, communication should suce to correct her mistake. Overall, there is a dilemma: either agents can fully adopt the group goals and sanctions or incentives should be idle, or they never can and there is no we-mode.
I now turn to the second topic, namely the eciency of the we-mode. According to Tuomela, choice-theoretic matters [show] that sometimes the we-mode approach is functional-rationally better than the pro-group I-mode one (77).
As the end of the section (4) shows, Tuomela's case rests on situations of coordination such as the Hi-Lo game, 2 in which agents have to coordinate on one of two options, one Pareto-dominating the other (simply put, being preferable for all agents). Although it may seem obvious that both players should choose the action which is part of the dominating outcome (namely, H), according to game theory it is just as rational for individually rational players to choose the other one (L). What matters to rationality is only stabilityI choose the best option given that the others do their part, and they do the same. Interestingly, in this situation, both Tuomela's we-mode and Bacharach's team-reasoning prescribe that H is the only rational solution. Thus they can be said functionally better, because they lead to strictly better outcomes.
1 And in some cases can decide: Tuomela's account takes into account situations in which groups eectively have leaders.
2 Typically represented by the following game matrix: cisely in order to get rid of such a condition; so the we-mode`group-thinking' is not easily comparable to it. This damages the analogy between game-theoretic collective reasoning and the we-mode, and thus the claims to the irreducibility of the we-mode.
Moreover, in games other than coordination problems, the gap between collective and individual rationality narrows down even further. In a Prisoner's dilemma (and social dilemmas in general), the we-mode can rationally explain cooperation just as well as the pro-group I-mode can. So even if they formally lead to dierent equilibria, the former does not lead to better cooperative outcomes and may even be considered as harder to attain. This point could be made formally; but intuitively it is reected by the fact that the CWM denition necessitates much stronger conditions than the CIM one. Overall, the reasons for nding the we-mode`functional-rationally better' are ambivalent. Note that the similar behavioural consequences of the we-mode and the pro-group I-mode in social dilemmas is precisely why, as Tuomela remarks, empirical studies do not provide a clear and unambiguous evidential argument for the we-mode weperspective (85).
Finally, is the we-mode irreducible to the I-mode? Because it purports to dene joint action analytically on the basis of apparently purely collective concepts, Tuomela's account of joint action strikes a balance between individualistic approaches (exemplied by Bratman) and holistic but non-explanatory ones (such as Searle's). But is it really irreducible to individual properties? Note that there are dierent ways to be`irreducible' (ontologically, conceptually, functionally. . . ).
3 Here, it is useful to keep in mind Tuomela's following claim: The we-mode approach here is not reducible to the individualistic, I-mode framework because it necessarily diers from it with respect to two facts: it is based on a group agent as the basic agent and it involves we-reasoning instead of I-reasoning. (82) First, the foregoing discussion has shown that functional irreducibility may be dubious: dierences between the we-mode and the pro-group I-mode are, or rather between collective and individual reasoning, are not clear, whether one considers coordination problems or social dilemmas.
Second, what about ontological irreducibility? While groups are obviously not individuals themselves as they do not have bodies, consciousness, etc., some of their properties may still be irreducible to that of individuals. One argument against irreducibility could be the following: since all collective properties involved in the we-mode are collectively built, that is, are the product of interactions between individuals, ultimately their origin can be explained in terms of individual properties. At best this could only mean that the we-mode is diachronically reducible, not that it isn't synchronically. Nonetheless, Tuomela does not discuss ontological irreducibility (cf. 77).
I think the most promising thesis is that of conceptual irreducibility, which seems to be more fundamental.
4 Conceptual irreducibility can be understood in two senses, depending on whether one talks of the collective concepts that dene the we-mode (rst sense), or of the concepts that agents resort to when acting in the we-mode are irreducible (second sense).
In the rst sense, there are reasons to think that collective properties do not supervene on individual ones. For instance, Tuomela emphasizes that group interests are collectively accepted. Collective acceptance typically does not supervene on individual properties: given a conguration of individual beliefs, collective acceptance could be present or absent. This depends on the decision procedure employed by the group, which in turn depends on the group's history.
For instance, that a high proportion of members believe something may lead to its acceptance if majority voting is used, but not if decisions are taken by an (previously) elected subgroup whose members happen to not share these beliefs.
Now for the second sense. Even if the group agent is not ontologically irreducible, it plays a prominent role in the participants' reasoning, because they do their part of what is best from the group's point of view. Even when this decision is not actually taken, it is as if the group agent, or a hypothetical leader of the group, rst took a decision, which agents then follow. Taking into account a group agent of some sort is necessary to the we-mode. As we have seen, collective reasoning does not dier too much from individual reasoning in terms of observable results; but two inferences rules can be conceptually distinct even if they lead to identical conclusions in most cases. 5 According to Tuomela, the we-mode approach here is not reducible to the individualistic, I-mode framework because it necessarily diers from it with respect to two facts: it is based on a group agent as the basic agent and it involves we-reasoning instead of I-reasoning. (82) I agree with the former reason rather than with the latter. 
